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THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Michael J. Biesiada, Ph.D. student | School of Public Policy and Leadership | Greenspun College of Urban Affairs
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
ABSTRACT
• The purpose of this prospectus is to examine county-level contextual factors that impact 
direct democracy mechanisms and voter turnout. The prospectus contains two essays 
that build upon each other with fitting theoretical frameworks. The first essay 
investigates the impact of contextual factors on a county government’s decision to 
permit citizen initiatives.  This essay applies new institutionalism theory to understand 
the current connections between government structure and direct democracy 
mechanisms within U.S. counties.  County governments play a vital role in American 
democracy, yet little is known about why some counties permit direct democracy 
mechanisms while others do not. I address a gap in the literature that focuses on policy 
outcomes that can vary at the county-level due to election laws. Election laws that 
permit direct democracy mechanisms often benefit voters by initiating or repealing 
legislation that more closely reflects the citizenry. Given the dearth of research on direct 
democracy mechanisms at the county-level, I examine the 1) citizen initiative, 2) 
legislative referendum, 3) popular referendum, and 4) provision for recall. To investigate 
counties that permit direct democracy mechanisms, I focus on contextual factors that 
include form of government, socioeconomics, and demographics. I apply a series of 
cross-sectional logit regressions by using micro-level county data from the International 
City/County Management Association (ICMA) 2014 County Government Survey, 
American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. Census Bureau, and CDFI fund. Subsequently, I 
use the models to detect and explain variations of direct democracy that exist in the 
3,031 county governments surveyed with populations between 10,000 and 500,000. BACKGROUND
• Issue 
• Direct democracy mechanisms allow citizens to participate in the lawmaking process, 
often bypassing their state legislator with the intent of improving government 
performance (Matsusaka, 2005). But does government have any bearing on allowing 
citizen access to direct democracy mechanisms? This essay explores the relation 
between government structure and direct democracy mechanisms in American counties. 
The issue at hand is determining whether commission governments make institutional 
decisions that result in different outcomes relative to reformed governments.  
• Known 
• In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States witnessed the 
rise of populist and progressive movements that called for a direct democracy reform 
(Givel, 2009; Lawrence, Donovan, & Bowler, 2009). This history led to many changes that 
currently inform the modern institutional arrangement between local government and 
direct democracy. About half of American states have a mix of three forms of direct 
democracy: the initiative, popular referendum, recall (Todd, 2014); and all but one state 
has the legislative referendum available (Damore, Bowler, & Nicholson, 2012). As 
Matsusaka (2005) notes, direct democracy has been driving policy change on a number 
of topics that include affirmative action, municipal debt, and minimum wage laws. Along 
these lines, many scholars have argued that direct democracy enables citizens to 
counteract special interest groups that can be harmful to public policy (Boehmke, 2005; 
Matsusaka, 2005; Tolbert, McNeal, & Smith, 2003). 
• Unknown 
• State rules permit counties to decide on which direct democracy mechanisms to 
incorporate (Arceneaux, 2002), but it is currently unknown which counties decide to 
enact these policies at the local level. Therefore, a wide variation of direct democracy 
mechanisms exists at the county-level within the American states. Furthermore, it is 
currently unknown which county governments decide to incorporate direct democracy 
mechanisms as a political institution. Likewise, little research has delved into the 
theoretical nature of examining institutional arrangements at the county-level.  As a 
result, despite the increasing demands of county governments, there is limited research 




I anticipate the findings of this study will contribute to local government policy literature in 
several ways. While controlling for institutional and demographic characteristics, I outline 
the findings below based on the data describing policy choices in all 750 American counties. 
First, the citizen initiative and popular referendum are more likely to exist with the 
commission form of government, and the legislative referendum is more likely to exist with 
the council manager form of government. This result would indicate that elected officials 
are more inclined to meet median voter demands, at least with respect to the initiative and 
popular referendum. Second, I expect that a higher population density will increase the 
likelihood of the popular referendum and decrease the likelihood of the legislative 
referendum. This implies that community networks have an impact on the use of a 
referendum, but not necessarily the recall or citizen initiative.  Third, I expect that home 
rule will have a positive impact on the existence of both the citizen initiative and legislative 
referendum. This finding would reveal that local governments are more likely to use home 
rule powers to afford citizens the benefits of direct democracy. In sum, this study will 
provide public policymakers with key insights regarding the relation between form of 
government and direct democracy mechanisms. This relationship is an increasingly 
important policy tool to study since scholars argue direct democracy is central to improving 
individuals’ quality of life (Matsusaka, 2005)
METHODS
The hypotheses are estimated using a cross-sectional logit model to estimate the existence 
of county level direct democracy mechanisms. That is, the binary dependent variable for 
each direct democracy mechanism is coded as zero for when a mechanism is not permitted, 
and one for when it is permitted.  I analyze the logit model for each form of direct 
democracy to include: 1) citizen initiative, 2) popular referendum, 3) recall initiative, and 4) 
legislative referendum. This strategy accounts for differences in state constitutions that 
either permit or do not permit each form of direct democracy at the county-level. Similar to 
Coan & Holman (2008), to account for the non-linear relationship between income and the 
existence of direct democracy, I square the income variable. I also report robust standard 
errors associated with each coefficient, which corrects for heteroscedasticity by using a 
variance matrix more robust than that of ordinary least squares (Farmer, 2017). 
KEY HYPOTHESES 
• 𝐇𝐇𝟏𝟏: There is a higher probability of direct democracy mechanisms available in 
counties that have commission governments relative to reformed governments
• 𝐇𝐇𝟐𝟐: There is a higher probability of direct democracy mechanisms available in 
counties with a higher educated population.
• 𝐇𝐇𝟑𝟑: There is a higher probability of direct democracy mechanisms available in 
counties with a higher income population.
• 𝐇𝐇𝟒𝟒: There is a higher probability of direct democracy mechanisms available in 
counties with a higher population density.
Logistic Estimates Table Initiative Initiative Leg. Ref Leg. Ref Pop Ref Pop Ref Recall Recall
Independent Variables Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z| Coef. P > |z|
Council Manager -0.47 0.04 0.48 0.02 -0.51 0.02 0.25 0.20
Population Density 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.13
Median Household Income 0.91 0.15 -0.37 0.54 -0.17 0.78 -0.87 0.18
Education Attainment -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.83 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.15
State Home Rule 0.63 0.00 0.57 0.01 0.03 0.88 -0.26 0.28
Median Property Tax 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.32
Population Diversity 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.92 -0.01 0.18 0.00 0.84
Log Population Total -0.07 0.40 0.18 0.01 -0.04 0.61 -0.15 0.05
Northcentral Region 0.57 0.02 -0.03 0.88 0.45 0.05 1.22 0.00
Northeast Region 0.63 0.14 -0.11 0.77 0.35 0.40 -0.13 0.76
West Region 1.71 0.00 0.43 0.09 1.58 0.00 2.32 0.00
Constant -1.24 0.23 -1.07 0.25 0.37 0.72 1.25 0.20
Number of Observations 645.00 657.00 637.00 633.00
Wald Chi Square Statistic 73.91 31.73 59.08 90.17
LR chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.13
Notes. DV: Initiative, Legislative Refendum, Popular Referendum, Recall
p < .05 in bold 
